KEEPING IT RATIONAL:
PERSONS AND RATIONALITY IN PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY

Assessments of rationality are central in the psychiatric practice, yet there is little theoretical agreement on what role rationality plays. Many philosophers of psychiatry take rationality to be a necessary feature of intentionality – a view that Graham (2020) labels the *Rationality in Intentionality Thesis* (RIT). RIT draws on a broadly Davidsonian view of the mind wherein to understand others as persons, their intentional attitudes must be rational (Davidson 2002). I challenge the tenability of this aspect of RIT arguing that we should adopt a broader view of the mind. My argument develops as follows. After a brief introduction of RIT, I raise a counterexample to it. Drawing from Stich (1996), I introduce the case of Mrs T, an individual who suffers from a degenerative brain disease which causes her to lack even the most minimal rational capacities. Unlike other cases where irrationality still presupposes a background of rationality, I show that Mrs T's condition undermines any attribution of propositional attitudes altogether. Nevertheless, Mrs T still retains forms of non-rational intentional attitudes. I argue that we can avoid the outcome of withholding attributions of personhood by recognising that not all intentional attitudes are propositional attitudes, where the former are not always rational.

Davidson, D. (2002). *Mental events*. In: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: OUP.
Graham, G. (2020). *The Disordered Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness*. Third Edition. Routledge.
Stich, S.P. (1996). *Deconstructing the mind*. New York: OUP.